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Case Studj of a Fourth Generotion MRM Program 
CASE STUDY O F A  FOURTH GENERATIONMRM PROGRAM 
ATA CORPORATE AVIATION OPERATOR 
Manoj S. Patankar and James C. Taylor 
ABSTRACT 
Research in aviation maintenance human factors maps the evolution of MRM training programs into four distinct 
generations bridging attitude awareness programs, behavior changes, and process and structure changes. This paper 
analyzes a fourth generation MRM program from the perspective of the multi-step process, developed by the authors, 
as a guide for airlines to develop their own human factors programs. This analysis demonstrates that the corporate 
maintenance human factors program under review is a forerunner; however, a few additional, definitive steps during 
the planning, implementation, and follow-up would make this program more robust. 
INTRODUCTION 
Patankar (1999a) presented ten steps to developing a 
Maintenance Resource ManagementMaintenance Human 
Factors (m) program in an introdumryworkshop 
during the Thirteenth International Human Factors in 
Aviation Maintenance Symposium. In the fourteenth 
symposium, Taylor & Patankar (2000) praented a 
comparativeanalysisoffour generations ofMRM programs 
based on their field observations at several aviation 
maintenance facilities in the United States. The present 
paper analyzes a previously published case of a cotporate 
aviation operator (cf: Patankar and Taylor, 1999) from the 
perspectives of the "ten steps" and the "four generations of 
MRM." The authors conclude that this corporate aviation 
operator, whether intentionally or not, was successhl in 
implementing some of the ten steps, and its program 
classifies as a fourth generation MRM program. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Corporate Case 
Instead of using the traditional Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) training programs available in the 
market, the corporate operator under study--Company A-- 
decided to use an alternative approach to risk management. 
They chose QuantumPro Management System (QMS), an 
innovative management program that focuses on 
organizational change through improved communication. 
In adopting the QMS program, Company A's strategy was 
to effect both an organizational change as well as an 
individual change. In order to implement this strategy, the 
company had to provide a and a w. Their 
structure was the requirement of briefings among pilots, 
among mechanics, and between the pilots and mechanics. 
Their process was the use of "concept alignment process" 
(CAP) as a way ofensuring that all parties are actingon the 
same concept. If all parties are not acting on the same 
concept, CAP provides a way of resolving ambiguous 
andlor conflicting viewpoints among the communicating 
parties in various briefings. Atter the indoctrination of the 
QMS among the pilots, it was applied in a streamlined 
format to the maintenance hction. In this latter 
application, it was called Error Reductim and Decision 
Making Protocol (ERDMP). It was used for preflight pilot- 
mechanic briefings, post-flight pilot-mechanic debriefings, 
and briefings among the maintenance personnel. 
The basis ofthe CAP is a simple communication protocol 
that desensitizes rank and provides means for all the 
individuals to share information. At the heart of this 
protocol is the concept. A concept is defined as an idea, 
remark, or an observation that is stated by one person and 
is either affirmed or challenged by the co-worker. If a 
difference between the points of view is stated, it is the 
team's responsibility to seek validation for that concept 
from an independent third source. If one concept can be 
validated and one cannot, the validated concept shall 
become the working concept. If both concepts can be 
validated or if neither concept can be validated, the most 
conservative of the two is chosen. Once a working concept 
is agreed upon, it shall be further scrutinized using a 
predefined judgement process. Oilen in this process, the 
mechanics, managers, and pilots go beyond this point to 
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research the cause of the discrepancy in the concepts and 
recommend appropriate changes. Changes have been made 
in operatingpoliciesandprocedures,maintenancemanuals, 
and other documentation as a died result of this process. 
The pilots have been using this process for six years and the 
mechanics have employed it for just over two years. 
Ten Steps to Developing MRM Programs 
Patankar (1999a) presented the following ten steps to 
guide new MRM prwam developers in designing and 
implementing their programs. 
Stev 1: Understand the Corvorate Mission or 
_PurDose 
It is imperative that the Human Factors (HF) manager 
understands the corporate mission and abides by the 
corporate values for himiher to receive support from the 
top-management. Kotter (1998) states that one ofthe main 
reasons for change programs to fail is that the changes are 
not anchored in the corporation's culture. If the HF 
manager does not align hidher MRM program with the 
corporate purpose, hdshe risks failure. 
"With change, the task is to manage the dynamic, not the 
pieces" (Duck, 1998 p.57). The HF manager should be able 
t o  identi@ all the components required tomake the MRM 
program successfUl at hislher airline and then orchestrate 
these components such that helshe is able to manage the 
dynamic and not the individual pieces. Such an action 
requires strong commitment 6 om the CEO or aperson who 
enjoys an incredible amount of political strength in the 
airline. 
Stm 2: Personally Practice MRM Princivles 
If the HF manager is able to practice some ofthe key HF 
principles such as communication skills, teamwork, and 
avoiding complacency, hdshe will become an active role- 
model for others to follow. Also, personal practice will 
demonstrate the manager's commitment to the MRM 
program because "Management is the message. . . 
Everything managers say-or don't saydelivers a message. 
. . Topmanagement should start by requiring a change of 
behavior, and when that yields improved pdormance, the 
excitement and beliefwill follow" (Duck, 1998 p. 61-63). 
Stev 3: Tdentifi and Recruit Key Persons to 
Chamion Your MRM Promam 
"The scarcest resource in any organization are 
performing people" (Drucker, 1998 p. 19). Some airlines 
have used representatives kom all the "interest groups," for 
example, one could use representatives from the labor 
union(s), managemmt, FAA, and outside consultants. 
"People are naturally scientific. They must see the reasons 
for change" (Martin, 1998 p. 13 1). Once these persons see 
the reasons for the change and they have a positive attitude 
toward the h4FN program, they exhibit W-compliant 
behavior consistently. They will act as positive role models 
similar to the HF manager. They will consciously and 
unconsciously influence the development and 
implementation of the MRM program. 
In selecting these key persons, one should also try to seek 
leaders rather than managers. Although leadership and 
management arenot mutually exclusive qualities, the point 
is that a person needs to posses leadership qualities in order 
for that person to efktively champion the MRM program. 
The reason for this choice is based on Kotter's (1998 p. 38) 
observation that "Management is about wping with 
complexity and leadership is about wping with change." 
S u m s l l  implementation of an MRM program is a 
cultural change process. 
Stev 4: Alim the MRM Mission with the 
Corporate Mission 
If the goals and vision of an MRM program are not 
aligned with those of the airline, the MRM program is not 
likely to succeed. Generally, the purpose of most MRM 
programs is to bring about a change in behavior such that 
it enhancessafa therefore, it is highly likely tobealigned 
with the corporate purpose of most airlines. However, if 
there is any doubt about this alignment, explicit changes 
must be made to the corporate purpose/values prior to 
launching an MRM program. 
Sometimes, it is evident that the published mission 
statement is different from the prevalent practices. For 
example, one of the corporate values may be to respect the 
employees, yet the employees may be working without a 
contract. In such cases, large-scale management changes 
need to take place prior to the initiation of an MRM 
program. 
Step 5: Articulate a Vivid Vision for Your MRM 
proeram 
Vision provides guidance about what to preserve and 
what to change (Collins & Porras, 1997). The typical MHF 
training programs discuss certain desirable behaviors and 
caution the participants about unsafe behaviors. However, 
Page 22 
2
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 10, No. 3 [2001], Art. 3
h tps://c mmons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol10/iss3/3
DOI: ttps://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2001.1281
they do not present a clear vision with vivid description of 
what it will be like to achieve the MHF goal. Consider the 
following example of Sony's envisioned future, as 
articulated in the 1950s: 
"We will create products that become 
pervasive around the world. . .We will be the first 
Japanese company to go into the U.S. market and 
distribute directly. . . We will succeed with 
innovations that U.S. companies have failed at 
-such as the transistor radio. . . Fitly years fiom 
now, ourbrandnamewill beas well known asany 
in the world. . . and will signify innovation and 
quality that rival the most innovative companies 
anywhere. . . 'Made in Japan' will mean 
something fine, not something shoddy" (cf: 
Collins & Porras, 1997 p. 237). 
Steo 6: Develop an MRM Program 
Implementation Strategy 
Is the MRM program going to seek an attitude change 
first or a behavior change first? A layered approach that 
combines both attitude change and behavior change could 
be used to offer instruction and practice sessions in small 
units. For example, instruct one group of mechanics and 
their supervisors in the fundamentals ofhuman factors and 
then provide them with practice sessions to implement 
these human factors principles in their daily work. Based 
on the feedback received from these participants, the 
instruction and practice sessions could be refined. 
The behavior-first approach is results-driven; therefore, 
it "stakes out specific targets and matches resources, tools, 
and action plans to requirements ofreaching those targets" 
(Schaffer & Thompson, 1998 p.91). If a company has 
already completed the awareness part of the training, it is 
critical that it uses the data available on effectiveness of 
MRM program, and focuses the future efforts on results- 
driven implementation. Consider this remark by the hockey 
star Wayne Gretzky, who explained his success by saying, 
"I skate where the puck is going to be, not where it has 
been" (cited in Augustine, 1998 p.174). From an 
implementation perspective, a company needs to think 
about why its MRM program will not be implemented. If 
the HF manager is able to effectively identifythesereasons, 
helshe may be able to plan a counter-strategy and thereby 
have a higher probability of success. 
While planning the implementation strategy, it is also 
essential tonote how exactly one is planning toevaluate the 
perfomar;ce of the paiticipmis. Eo :he paiticipaii:~ ha;,e 
Case Shdy of a Fourth Generation MRM Program 
any specific incentives to practice the newly learned 
behaviors? The HF manager should try to envision why the 
participants may not practice the newly learned behaviors 
even if they agree with them. The HF manager should try 
to identi& the obstacles in practicing the HF-compliant 
behaviors because "not removing obstacles to the new 
vision" is another key reason for change programs to fail 
(Kotter, 1998 p. 13). The problem, howeva, is usually with 
middle or upper management not willing to make the 
required changes. They view the situation from a different 
context. For example, in the case of one major airline, the 
researchers observed that the airline had initiated self- 
directed teams in maintenance to improve the quality of 
work. The managers thought that such teams were a threat 
to their position. So, they subtly undermined the effort of 
the teams and eventually abandoned the concept. 
Dismantling the self-directed teams left technicians very 
bitter and they lost m t  in the management. The 
mechanics and the managers were considering the concept 
of self-directed teams from diRerent contexts: the 
mechanics were using the self-directed teams to make 
process changes that improved qualiy, whereas, the 
managers were feeling insecure due to the increased self- 
reliance of their mechanics. "Context is like the color ofthe 
light, not the objects in the room. Context colors everything 
in the corporation. . . People have contexts just as 
organizations do. Our individual context is our hidden 
strategy for dealing with life; it determines all the choices 
we make" (Goss, Pascale, & Athos, 1998 p. 89-100). 
Context can change attitudes for the w o r s e a s  seen in the 
example above, or for the better. 
S t e ~  7: Obtain Resource Commitments from 
Upper Manapement 
A largemle change program such as the MRM program 
requires consistent commitment from the management in 
terms of the conventional resources like time, personnel, 
and money. Some companies may acknowledge the value 
of an MRM program, but just may not have the personnel 
to spare for training or the budget to actually implement the 
changes that aresuggested by their employees. Ifthis is the 
case; the upper manapment needs to seriously evaluatethe 
company's core purpose and values. Nothing is more 
detrimental to the MRM program than the participants 
losing fe.:t!? ir? it because they cannot even get the basic 
equipment to do their jobs. For example, the researchers 
observed that some of the participants from a major 
e-1:- ,, ,,,,e's MRM prjgain contimed to i;se k!: loaders as 
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ladders even afler their MRh4 training. They knew that this 
practice was dangerous, but they were told by their 
supervisor to continue with this practice because he did not 
have the budget for a new ladder. 
Also, some airlines have experienced several changes in 
their upper-management in therecent years. Consequently, 
themiddle management is not very sure abut the resources 
available for the MRM program. Unless, a detailed plan is 
endorsed by the top-management and appropriate resources 
are allmted to it, the new middle management is not likely 
to honor the commihnentsofthepriormiddlemanagement. 
Sten 8: Develou Means to Build Em~loyee Trust 
Sometimes, the MRM program has a tendency to be 
construed as another management fad ofthe week. To steer 
clear of this interpretation, it is essential that the HF 
manager takes concrete steps toward building mutual trust 
among the employees and a trust in the program. One of 
the best ways of developing this trust is to demonstrate 
through behavior, action, and results that the program 
works. ". . . hust in a time of change is based on two 
things: predictability and capability. . . Predictability 
consists of~ntention and ground rules: what are ow general 
goals and who will we make decisions? To trust an 
organization, both managers and their reports must define 
the capability that each is providing; and each side has to 
believe that the other is capable of playing the new role" 
(Duck, 1998 p. 65-72). Typically, the management seems 
to be encouraging the mechanics to use the HF principles 
and practice safe behaviors, but on the other hand, they do 
not support a mechanic who uses the lock-out tag-out 
procedure to stop an unsafe activity. No wonder, in such a 
climate, that trust becomes a critical issue. Because of such 
experiences of the front-line maintenance personnel, it is 
very difficult for MRM champions to establish trust. "One 
of the paradoxes of change is that trust is hardest to 
establish when you need it the most." (Duck, 1998 p. 69). 
Step 9: Develon Tools to Measure MRM Success 
The tools used to measwe an MRM program's success 
should be responsive to the details articulated in the vision 
statement and to the program's goals. These tools should 
also interrelate very closely with the corporate values. If 
there is a strong correlation between the core values, 
program goals, program vision, and prcgram measures, the 
implementation and continued evolution of the MRh4 
program is very likely. In the long-term, it will certainly 
1 have a positive affect on the organizational and 1 
professional cultures at that airline. I 
A difficulty that many HF managers have experienced is 
the difficulty associatedwith provingthe financial viability I 
of MRM programs Two distinct approaches are now 
available to HF managers: Return On Investment (ROI) 
from MRM training and Activity Based Costing (ABC). 
Taylor (2000) presented a formula to calculate the ROI 
from MRM awareness training programs. This formula 
acknowledges the concurrent implementation of multiple 
safety initiatives and enables the HF manager to calculate 
the ROI ern MRM training as a portion ofthe total ROI 
fom all safety initiatives. Patankar and Taylor (2000) 
further demonstrated that targeted- training programs 
can achieve their specific goals with a significant degree of 
success. Some change program implementation experts, on 
the other hand, are advocating ABC. "It not only measures 
what it wsts to do a task, it also records the cost of not 
doing, such as the cost of downtime, and the wst of 
reworking or scrapping a defective part. The costs of not 
doing, which traditional cost accounting cannot and does 
notrecord, oflen equal and sometimes even exceed the costs 
of doing. Activity-based costing therefore gives not only 
much better cost control, but increasingly, it also gives 
result control. Its greatest impact is likely to be on the 
service industry" (Drucker, 1998 p. 5) Once in a while, the 
accountants need to be reminded that "enterprises are paid 
to create wealth, not control costs." @. 12). "When one 
leading company can demonshate the long-term advantage 
of its superior performance on quality or innovation or any 
other non-6nancial measure, it will change the d e s  for all 
its rivals forever" @. 26). Whether one measures the 
training ROI or uses the ABC approach to quantify the 
financial impact of an MRM training program, the results 
of such measurements will provide quantitative evidence 
that supports the positive effects of good MRM programs. 
Nonetheless, non-financial measures such as employee 
morale, job satisfixtion, and organizational attachment can 
also be used determine the MRM program's success. The I 
tools used to measure MRM success must consider b t h  
financial and non-financial impact of MRM programs. 
Sten 10: Develou Structures and Processto Sustain 
MRM-based Changes 
For an MRM program to be truly effective, it must stand 
the test of time and management changes. The cutwmes of 
these programs should be strong enough to protect the 
Page 24 
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program and the organizational culture, irrespective of the 
management changes. The airline should truly be able to 
"preserve the core and stimulate progress" (cf: Collins & 
Porras, 1997). Certainly, other change programs will 
emerge in the future, but the airline's core values must be 
preserved. 
Fourth Generation MRM Programs 
The fourth generation MRM programs are defined by 
Taylor and Patankar (2000) as systemic programs that use 
the knowledge gained firom the experience ofthe past three 
generations and &om recent innovative processes to 
standardize communication and tactical decision-making. 
For the first time, these programs are being designed and 
implemented kom a systemic perspective. Data &om the 
past three generations of MRM programs shows that 
different MRM programs usually achieve different results. 
Airlines are now adding a skills training module to their 
classroom instruction and making it a true 'training" 
program that is more likely to result in more open 
communication (Patankar & Taylor, 2000). These airlines 
are also aware ofthe interpersonal, trust issues that impede 
self-disclosure, and they are striving to incorporate a 
maintenance emor investigation (MEI) module in their 
training, and in their larger program, so that the 
participants understand the goal and the procedure of such 
investigation. In the skills training module, the airlines are 
beginning to train their maintenance personnel to use 
simple, standard processes to detect and resolve differences 
in information through third-party validation. The airlines 
are now bener informed about the capabilities and 
limitations of MRM programs, and they are embarking on 
a new result-oriented approach to safety through strategic, 
system-wide, changes. 
Understanding the human factor in unanticivated events. 
Real time knowledge of what human factors lie behind 
- 
classes of maintenance errors is important to obtain, and it 
is central to the long-range and comprehensive success of 
MRM. Processes for a human-centered maintenance error 
investigation (MEI) are becoming objects of serious 
interests in aviation maintenance organization (Allen & 
Marx, 1994; FAA, 1999). However, full-blown 
maintenance experience with such p r o p s  is limited. 
Recent assessment of ME1 in the U.S. shows that there has 
been little commitment yet by either the air carriers or 
repair stations to see such error investigation and analysis 
become a new way of doing business (Marx, 1998). 
JAAER, Spring2001 
Trust within the maintenance system. 
Informal reports tom users suggest that the mechanics' 
limited trust of the ME1 process creates an obstacle to its 
widespread diffusion. Unless a strong culture for open 
communication and assertiveness already exists in their 
organization, relatively few mechanics will voluntarily or 
willingly disclose what they believe to be the 'teal stoly." 
A mechanic's individualism (Taylor, 1999; Taylor & 
Patankar, 1999) and self-reliance (Taylor & Christensen, 
1998) can create a barrier to their trust in others. 
In order to develop a strong safety culture, a maintenance 
organization must k t  recognize its own organizational 
and occupational culture, and it must appreciate the 
interplay between these two with the effects of national 
origins and cultures of its individual members (Taylor, 
1999; Patankar, 1999b). 
Diect focus on behavior change 
The focus of contemporary MRM programs is now 
moving toward active error reduction through structured 
communication. Patankar and Taylor (1999) described a 
case t o m  the corporate aviation environment that uses a 
'khavior-change fist'' approach instead of the prevalent 
"attitudechange first." In the earlier MRM generations 1 
and 3 (cf: Taylor and Patankar, 2000), companies simply 
provided classroom instruction and hoped that the desired 
change in attitudes and behavior would take place 
automatically. This strategy fwused on changing the 
participants' attitude toward safety through education and 
persuasion, and sometimes skills-training. Its developers 
hoped that participants' behavior would change as a 
consequence of the classroom experience alone. 
Unfortunately, the evaluations of such '?raining" programs 
for improving communication revealed that the subsequent 
behavior change is limited - either in scope or duration 
(Taylor and Christensen, 1998). 
At the same time there were companies that began to 
provide a simple sh.udure and process for c~nmunication 
among the following departments associated with aviation 
operations: flight crew, maintenance, and administration. 
These companies assumed that if they provided a simple, 
consistent communication and decision-making process, 
and the outcome of this process was promptly acted upon 
and continuously supported, their employees would 
continue to use it and could eventually change their 
attitudes. The immediate interest ofthese companies was in 
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changing their employees' work-related communication 
behavior. They did not use the better !mown "attitude 
change" approach taken in MRM generations 1 and 3. 
The Structured Communication Process 
Basically, there are two aspects to achieving new 
communication behavior: fist, a structure which requires 
connected parties to communicate and second, a process 
that is followed consistently-regardless of the outcome. 
Structure: An example of structure 
might be an organizational policy for line 
maintenance which requires that for each 
flight an aircraft mechanic a d  (either by 
direction or discretion) as its liaison 
mechanic. This person is expected to meet 
with the flight crew and discuss the 
maintenance issues with them. The pilots are 
expected to remain available after arrival to 
discuss maintenance discrepancies with the 
mechanic. During such discussions, both the 
flight crew and the maintenance mechanic@) 
are required to follow the preagreed 
communication process described below. 
Another example of structure b a policy 
requiring that (a) maintenance shift turnovers 
take place face-to-face and (b) mechanics, 
leads, and foremen briefly review the 
outgoing shift's use of the preagreed 
decision-making process. 
m: The process for enhanced 
aviation communication has been observed 
and documented (Lynch, 1996; Patankar & 
Taylor, 1999). Its originators have titled it the 
Concept Alignment Process (CAP). Figure 1 
illustrates a flow chart of this process. 
According to CAe, a "concept" is an idea or 
a piece of information presented by an 
observer o t  or aparty to, a technical decision. 
All members are expected to present their 
concepts. If the members present differing 
concepts, the CAP is initiated. Once the 
difference in concepts is recognized in Step 1 
(see figurel), the participants must seek 
validation of their concepts (Step 2) through 
third-party source such as a flight manual, air 
traffic controller, maintenance manual, 
company policy, etc. If only one concept can 
bevalidated, it is executed (Step 3). If none of 
the concepts can be validated or if all the 
concepts can be validated, the most 
conservative concept is chosen (Step 4). The 
chosen course of action, when executed in 
Step 5, will eliminate "active failures" (cf: 
Maurino, Reason, & Lee, 1997). 
Additionally, when multiple concepts are 
stated, whether valid or not, the members are 
expected to take the additional steps (Step 6) 
to investigate the reasons for the existence of 
multiple concepts. Such an investigation is 
aimed at providing systemic solutions to 
minimize the occurrence of invalid concepts 
and thereby minimize "latent failures" (cf: 
Mamino, Reason, and Lee, 1997), as 
indicated by Step 7. In figure 2, steps 6 and 7 
are presented with dashed l i e  because most 
people tend to accept the first-level finish, 
Finish 1 rather than pursuing the process two 
sets fiuther. 
Page 26 
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1. Recognize 
difference in information from 
information 
Start 
*____-__-_-----__ ,----------------------- 
, . 
( 7. Prevent "Latent '- 6. F d l o w p  to agreement 
: Failures" ,I : change policy, Eliminate "Active 
\ 
~-----------------'~ : process, or procedure , Failure" 
, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - a  
Finish 2 Finish 1 
Figure 1: Flow chart for the Concept Alignment Process 
The CAP addresses the following causes of human error 
accidents (Lynch, 1996): (a) non-adherence to procedure, 
(b) incorrect tactical decisions, (c) lack of attention or 
complacency, and (d) failure to challenge another 
member's error. 
The CAP provides objective procedures, thus making the 
use o f  this process observable to all. It provides team 
members with decision-making and conflict resolution 
methodology. It reduces chances of acting on incorrect 
concepts by facilitating collaborative task completion and 
decision-making. It reduces interpersonal conflict and 
defensiveness through the understanding that what is 
challenged is the concept and not the individual. All of 
these benefits have been observed in the use of CAP in the 
maintenanceen~irorir~~ent. Thefollowingdescription ofthe 
corporate case highlights those benefits. 
Management's commitment, Helmreich and Merrin 
suggest, is prerequisite to successful implementation of a 
new process or a new protocol because although an 
organizational culture is shaped by all ofthe employees, an 
organizational change is defined by the upper management. 
"Senior Management is a part of, not apart fkom, the 
culture; that is, it doesnot look down upon the organization 
and direct it by edict, rather it influences the culture as a 
participating element within the culture" (p.124). The 
change has to betop-down, through concrete and consistent 
examples. 
METHODOLGY 
This research compares Company A's MRM program 
with the ten-step process recommended by Patankar 
(1999a). Additionally, the characteristics of Company A's 
MRM program, especially its strategy and effectiveness, 
were mapped against those of the four generations 
Oreanizational safeht culture and management su~oort  classified by Taylor and Patankar (2000). 
Assuming that organizational culture has the potential for The data collection and analysis would have been easier 
thegreatest impact on safety, Helmreich and ~ e r r i t t  (I 998) and more objective if the corporate operator had a written 
present strategiestounifyandstrengthen theorganizational MRM plan. In the absence of such formal plan, the authors 
culture and aim to introduce safety as a shared value. have based their comments on field observations and 
JAAER, Spring2001 Pasc 27 
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interview data. 
RESULTS 
Stepby-step comparison 
Step 1: Understand the cornorate mission or 
The company's core purpose is "to make technical 
contributions for the advancement and welfare of 
humanity;" whiletheaviation unit'spurpose was to provide 
the company employees with a safe aircratl. The aviation 
unit operated scheduled service to four to five plant 
locations to transport engineers and managers. On some 
occasions, they also flew the top executives to specific 
destinations outside their normal routes. When asked 
whether they would delay or cancel a flight for a safety- 
related issue, the management and the employees 
consistently said that they would. Such overriding 
importance of safety over production goals was supported 
by ow observations of the times when two oftheir aircraft 
experienced maintenance problems. 
One of the parent wmpany's core values is innovation. 
The company will not develop a product if the technology 
is not innovative enough. Perhaps, it is because ofthis core 
value that the aviation manager wanted to find a Crew 
Resowce Management program that was better than the 
type practiced in the airline industry. Also, such CRM 
program-the QuantumPro course--would be in perfect 
alignment with the wmpany's core purpose. 
Steo 2: Personally practice MRM orincioles 
In his book about how the company was built, m e  ofthe 
founders ofthe company expressed his unique objective: to 
expand and diversie only when the company can build on 
its existing strengths, and with the recognition that it has 
proven capability tomakea contribution. Since theaviation 
manager has been with the company for ova 25 years, he 
seemed to be l l l y  attuned with the founders' ideology. He 
was among the f ist  to take the QuantumPro course, and 
then he baame the one to model its implementation. 
Step 3: Identifv and recruit kev persons to 
chamoion vow MRM oromam 
This aviation department manager wuld not have done 
a better job in ident iwg and recruiting the key persons to 
champion the QuantumPro program. One of his pilots 
became a complete believer in the CAP process, and 
became a crusader for its consistent implementation. This 
pilot worked with the maintenance personnel and together, 
they customized the CAP process for maintenance use. 
The director of maintenance took keen interest in the 
QuantumPro course and modified its content to meet the 
maintenance department's needs. The maintenance 
personnel called it 'Zmr  Reduction and Decision Makimg 
Process (ERDMP)." 
The aviation manager, the chief pilot, the diuector of 
maintenance, and some highly enthusiastic program 
champions, actively modeled proper implementation ofthe 
QuantumProprogram. Consequently, theprocess was taken 
seriously by all personnel and the employees effected 
several safety-related changes in the organization. 
Step4: AlimtheMRMmission with the coruorate 
mission' 
Although the corporate mission was clear and the 
aviation deputment's purpose was clear, the mission ofthe 
CRhVh4RM program was not documented. 
It is possible that the aviation department did not 
encounter any obstacles ftom the corporate management in 
implementing the CRiWMRM program because these 
programs were, at least intuitively, compatible with the 
corporate mission and purpose. Nonetheless, a written 
mission and goals document would have been useful. 
Step 5: Articulate a vivid vision for vow MRM 
& 
Although the aviation department did not have a written 
vision for either their CRM or MRM program, their 
program championswereextremely effectivein keepingthe 
spirit of these programs vibrant. Perhaps, this live 
enthusiasm for both programs was more effective than a 
written statement by their manager. As the concept 
alignment process was practiced and subsequent structural 
or procedural changes weremade, the employees' belief in 
the program increased. Having an enthusiastic support 
ftom the program champions facilitated an incremental 
belief in the program among all the employees. 
Steo 6: Develoo an MRM oroaam 
imdementation straten, 1 
Upon reviewing the various types of Crew Resource 
Management programs that were available in the market, 
the aviation department manager and his pilots chose CMR 
' Noh: The wrpomte ose n& to s6engthen thew areas 
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hc.'s QuantumPro because it focused on observable 
behavioral changes irrespective of the internal attitudiial 
changes that may or may not take place within the 
individuals. However, only the flight department received 
a regular class in CRM. The maintenance department had 
only its director go through the class, and rest of the 
personnel got some training fiom one of the pilots and the 
maintenance director. So, it seems that the maintenance 
department may not have had a clear MRM program 
implementation strategy. However, the program 
champions, both mechanics as well as pilots, were very 
enthusiastic about the CRMiMRM program and they 
inspired the rest of the employees to use the QuantumPro 
system and its derivative, the ERDMP. 
Stew 7: Obtaim resowce commitments kom upper 
management 
The original QuantumPro course attended by pilots and 
the director of maintenance was quite expensive. This 
course also included takehome exercises that consumed 
several hours ofpersonal time. Perhaps, this cost is not as 
significant as the cost of changes that result &om 
implementing such a CRMIMRM program. The authors 
did not note any explicit resource commitments other than 
the course costs. However, the aviation department 
manager was effective in implementing structural and 
procedural changes in their daily business, asraommended 
though the implementation of the CRM/MRM program. 
S t e ~  8: Develop means to build emloyee trust 
The aviation depamnent manager, the chiefpilot, and the 
director ofmaintenance were able to build a strong sense of 
trust in QuantumRo and ERDMP. The researchers 
witnessed some instances wherethemaintenance personnel 
and the pilots had the opportunity to follow the preagreed 
process and determine corrective action. When each party 
observed that the process was successll and their 
managers supported it, regardless of the outcome, their 
trust in the process increased. 
Step 9: Develo~ tools to measure MRM success1 
The CRM success was beiig documented by some pilots, 
but the maintenance success was not getting such attention. 
The case study presented by Patankar and Taylor (1999) 
constitutes external evaluation, but the company needs an 
internal, more regular evaluation system. 
Case Study of a Fourth Generation MRM Program 
Stew 10: Develoo structures and orocesses to 
sustain MRM chances' 
Withii a year of implementing the MRM program, the 
company went through a layoff cycle. Now, the company 
has acquired new aircraft and has hired a new director of 
maintenance as well as some new mechanics and pilots. 
Since the department manager has remained the same and 
some of the original CRMtMRM program champions are 
still with the company, it reasonable to expect a resurgence 
in the MRM program in the near future. 
A Fourth Generation MRM Program 
Based on the experience of the 6rst three generations of 
MRM programs, the fourth generation programs, such as 
the Company A case, are starting to address the issue of 
balance among individual and organizational changes. In 
theory, both the organization and the individual must 
change in order to effect a long-term 
change in the safety culture. The &st generation MRM 
program customizedtheconcepts from flight-CRMtraining 
to maintenance-CFWMRh4 training by focusing on 
teamwork-munication between two or more 
individuals - but it was still personal change and little 
attempt was made to support it through organizational 
structure or process. The second generation MRM 
programs used focus groups to solve specific problems 
resulting in some organizational changes and some 
individual changes, but because these programs were 
focused at specific problems, once problems were solved 
and to continue the process proved difficult, the programs 
were discontinued. The third generation MRM programs 
focused on individual awarenessresulting in mostly passive 
individual change (Patankar and Taylor, In h i t ) .  
Now, as illustrated in Figure 2 below, the fourth 
generation MRM programs are trying balance the 
organizational change with the individual change. Such 
balance provides structure and processes for individuals to 
practice the desired behaviors, as well as the 
encouragement and personal support for individuals taking 
a positive attitude about safety, as well as knowledge and 
skills for how to do it. Strategy or purpose guides the 
balance. If either the organization or the individual does 
not perform the requisite function, the resultant behavior 
will be unbalanced, and it will not achieve the higher levels 
that are possible through planning (Taylor & Patankar, 
2000). 
' Note: The corporate case needs to mengthen these areas 
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Figure 2: The balance between organizational change and individual change 
CONCLUSION 
The corporate aviation case discussed in this paper, used a 
fourth generation MRM program and demonstrated a 
superior implementation strategy. Many of the traditional 
barriers to MRM implementation such as lack of 
management follow-up, loss of focus due to employee 
turnover, and lack of skills training on how to use the 
MRM knowledge were overcome by Company A. 
Additionally, the organizational culture at Company a 
valued innovation and strived to achieve a balance between 
the individual change (change in attitude and knowledge) 
and organizational change (by providing skuctures and 
processes that facilitate MRM implementation weak in 
some details of MRM implementation, it demonstrates a 
superior implementation strategy. It seems as though some 
of the steps in this case were informal; however, the 
corporate culture is such that it seeks to change their 
organization as well as the individual.0 
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